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THE USE/NONUSE/MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN 
THE COURTS. Edited by Michael J. Saks and Charles H. Baron. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books. 1980. Pp. ix, 189. $26. 
Social science data are increasingly being used at trial to prove 
facts that are otherwise difficult to observe. 1 Courtroom uses of em-
pirically generated data include, for example, determining markets 
in antitrust suits,2 calculating expected future earnings in personal 
injury cases,3 and supporting and rebutting employment discrimina-
tion charges.4 Courts have now become accustomed to hearing from 
economists, psychologists, and sociologists on an endless variety of 
subjects. 
Unfortunately, this growing use of social science research has 
been accompanied by profound misunderstandings between the so-
cial science and legal communities. s These misunderstandings stem 
primarily from a lack of knowledge within each field of the other's 
purposes and methodologies. In The Use/Nonuse/Misuse of Applied 
Social Research in the Courts, Michael Saks and Charles Baron 
bring together the suggestions of social scientists, lawyers, and judges 
for improving the working relationship between their disciplines. 
The book's objective is straightforward: to enhance the critical and 
intelligent use of social research data in the courts by narrowing the 
gap in understanding between the two communities (p. ix). The 
perspectives represented in this symposium cover the ideological 
spectrum, ranging from a sociology professor's frustration after at-
tempting to explain the fundamentals of multiple regression analysis 
before an administrative law judge (p. 99) to a state court judge's 
reluctance to believe one study's findings about the reliability of eye-
witness testimony (pp. 138-39). By juxtaposing such perspectives, 
Saks and Baron hope to explain why the quality of most courts' use 
of social science data is "miserable" (p. 8) and to illuminate the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of proposed reforms. 
Judges, lawyers, and social scientists all contribute to the nonuse 
and misuse of social science data through their differing perceptions 
1. For a discussion of the historical and potential use of social science data in courts, see P. 
ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972). 
2. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 330-33 (1961). 
3. See w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 905-06 (4th ed. 1971). 
4. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337-40 & n.20 
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237, 251 n.17 (1976). 
5. There is ample literature describing the misuse of social science data at trial. See, e.g., 
Hallock, The Numbers Game - The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation, 23 
VILL. L. REv. 5 (1977); Comment, Judicial Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Statistical Evidence, 41 J. 
URB. L. 165 (1969). See generally Levin, Education, Lffe Chance;, and the Courts: The Role of 
Social Science Evidence, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 236-40 (1975) (discussing the 
ramifications of courts having to choose between competing presentations of social science 
evidence). 
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of the purpose and meaning of research data. Judges, for example, 
are often skeptical about social research (pp. 11, 17, 48). This skepti-
cism results from several factors. First, the credibility of expert wit-
nesses is undermined because they act as "hired guns": each witness 
supports his side's theory, hence the testimony at trial diverges 
sharply. The confused fact-finder therefore concludes that the data 
are unreliable and ignores all of the experts (p. 137). Second, social 
science findings change more rapidly over time than do legal princi-
ples because subsequent research suggests different ways to explain 
the observed data (pp. 38, 150). Third, since judges are generally 
untrained in social science research methods, they often are unable 
to comprehend the data presented (pp. 15, 101).6 Finally, counterin-
tuitive data may be rejected simply because it offends the judge's 
preconceived notions of reality (pp. 37, 139). 
Lawyers contribute to the misuse problem because their role as 
advocates in an adversarial process affects their treatment of applied 
research. Their objective is not to establish a record consisting 
of scholarly detachment and commitment to truth, but to win a 
favorable verdict (p. 12). Lawyers thus have an incentive to manipu-
late data or to avoid presenting a balanced picture (pp. 12, 37-38). 
Similarly, since lawyers must build a case from "facts," they have an 
incentive to mischaracterize the nature of social science data. Data 
interpretation is couched in terms of probabilities and confidence 
levels (p. 70); for example, if the result ''A causes B" can be shown 
by data that explains twenty percent of the variance between two 
variables, that data is considered good by social scientists (p. 37). 
For purposes of simplicity, however, lawyers ignore that eighty per-
cent of the variance is not explained and simply argue that "A causes 
B" (p. 37). In so doing, they attribute a much higher level of cer-
tainty to applied research data than would social scientists (p. 71 ). 
The adversarial process, therefore, can itself confuse the issues, par-
ticularly when each side presents its own statistical analysis. 
Use/Nonuse/Misuse does not significantly criticize social re-
searchers or offer any meaningful advice to them about improving 
legal-social science communication. The authors do suggest that re-
searchers recognize the fundamental difference between the goals of 
each discipline. Courts are not in the business of seeking scientific 
truth; they are concerned with resolving disputes and are interested 
in ultimate scientific truth only to the extent that it furthers dispute 
resolution. Researchers should, therefore, recognize the inquisi-
tional nature of court proceedings, expect to be questioned, and re-
6. When only one side has presented complex social data in support ofits case, this lack of 
understanding may confront the trial judge with a dilemma: If the court lacks the resources 
necessary to evaluate the data, it will have to choose between ignoring the data or accepting it 
on faith. P. 76. 
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spond by defending their analysis in terms understandable to the 
court (p. 79).7 
Contributors to the book make a number of suggestions for im-
proving the legal profession's use of social science data. Some of 
these ideas, like the proposed Science Court (pp. 53-59), have been 
advanced before.8 This specialized court, comprised of impartial sci-
entific experts, could arguably make more informed judgments be-
tween competing theories than general courts. The book's 
discussion, however, does little more than inform the reader of the 
ongoing debate. Another proposal urges courts to use procedures 
authorized under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to digest 
complex evidence more thoroughly. These procedures include ap-
pointing a special master9 or a court adviser and trying the issue 
before an advisory jury (pp. 133-34).10 These proposals are also un-
developed; readers must tum elsewhere for an evaluation of their 
merits. 
Two proposals emerging from the symposium do offer grounds 
for new debate. The first, made by Professor Baron, advocates edu-
cating lawyers about social science research by making that research 
available in an indexed form similar to the West system currently 
used for cases (pp. 154-56). Lawyers skilled in the use of social sci-
ence data will win more lawsuits, Baron argues, so that the proposal 
will induce more lawyers to develop these skills. As lawyers become 
more sophisticated, the bench will also become conversant with data 
interpretation. Baron does not explain, however, why such an incen-
tive system has not already improved the quality of social science 
evidence presented at trial. 
The second proposal, made by Professor David Baldus, addresses 
a particular policy issue: the constitutional reasonableness of the 
death penalty in specific cases. Baldus advocates using quantitative 
analysis to determine whether a death sentence in a particular mur-
der case is "excessive" when compared with sentences of other "simi-
larly situated" defendants (pp. 83-94). 11 State courts typically apply 
a subjective "salient features" test to define the relevant pool of 
comparison cases (pp. 84-86). Using standard multiple regression 
7. The absence of any significant advice to researchers may have resulted from the book's 
structure: of the 34 contributors, only 12 were lawyers, judges, or law professors. 
8. For a discussion of the Science Court proposal, see Martin, The Proposed "Science 
Court," 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058 (1977). 
9. FED. R. C1v. P. 53. Special masters are experts appointed by the court to hear complex 
matters. The special master makes findings of fact and law and reports these to the court. 
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(c). Such an advisory jury could be composed of impartial scientific 
experts. P. 134. 
11. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 403 U.S. 238 (1972), states 
are prohibited under the eighth amendment from statutorily authorizing "excessive" death 
sentences. Whether a penalty is "excessive" is determined by comparing the challenged sen-
tence to sentences given to other defendants convicted on similar facts. 
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methodology, Baldus has identified thirteen factors or "main deter-
minants" that were important in California juries' sentencing deci-
sions between 1958 and 1966. These determinants vary significantly 
from the factors used in applying the salient features test; Baldus's 
test, therefore, will generate a different pool of comparison cases. 
Although his description is cursory, his methodology seems sound 
and his proposal should provoke considerable scholarly debate. 
The strength of Saks and Baron's work, however, lies not in these 
proposals. It rests instead in the varied collection of thoughts and 
opinions that the book offers. The work is surprisingly free from 
social scientists' technical jargon, and the brevity of the essays allows 
each contributor's personality to emerge. Although the book does 
lack developed substantive discussion, it exposes the reader to a vari-
ety of perspectives and thus serves a useful purpose. 
